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98 N.C. L. REV. 1447 (2020)

Hate, Interstate: The Fourth Circuit, Hate Crimes, and the
Commerce Clause in United States v. Hill *
The past twenty-five years have seen a dramatic reevaluation of the judiciary’s
understanding of the Commerce Clause, hallmarked by a categorical approach
to activity the Clause can reach. Congress has adapted as well, attempting to
shore up the constitutionality of legislation by including language aimed at tying
regulated activity to the Clause’s categorical jurisdiction (so-called
“jurisdictional elements”). Some courts have struggled in squaring these
categorical limits with a traditionally broad understanding of Commerce Clause
power. The Fourth Circuit’s conviction of James Hill for a bias-motivated
assault was one such struggle. This Recent Development argues that the Fourth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Hill improperly analyzed Hill’s
conviction under the Hate Crimes Prevention Act in a manner unmoored from
Commerce Clause precedent.
INTRODUCTION: UNITED STATES V. HILL
Amazon opened its Chester, Virginia, facility in 2012. 1 The expansive
facility is responsible for storing, packaging, and shipping millions of products
with help from the 2200 (or as many as 3200 depending on the season)
employees that roam the 1.2 million square-foot warehouse floor. 2 On May 22,
2015, that same floor was wiped clean of Curtis Tibbs’s blood. 3
Tibbs was a fulfillment associate for Amazon. 4 Colloquially known as
“packers,” these employees are responsible for moving items from conveyor
belts, scanning them, and boxing them for movement to other locations
throughout the facility. 5 It was in the midst of this boxing that Tibbs was
violently assaulted. 6 Surveillance footage from the warehouse showed the
assailant—fellow Amazon employee James Hill—approaching Tibbs from
behind as Tibbs was carrying packages. 7 Without warning, Hill repeatedly
punched Tibbs in the face leaving him with bruises, cuts, and a bloody nose. 8
* © 2020 Drew Bencie.
1. John Reid Blackwell, A Look Inside One of Amazon’s Warehouses in Virginia, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 18, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/dbb079b6655d4a73a1b8659423a4e67e [https://
perma.cc/8WUY-35ML].
2. Id.
3. See United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 194 (4th Cir. 2019).
4. Id. at 193.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 194.
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During subsequent questioning by an Amazon investigator and a police officer,
Hill freely admitted that he “didn’t like homosexuals,” and that he believed
Tibbs disrespected him “because he is a homosexual.”9 That justification for the
assault gave rise to a novel constitutional question.
In United States v. Hill, 10 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court
to evaluate the constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.
Hate Crimes Prevention Act (“HCPA” or “Act”) 11 as applied to an unarmed
assault of a victim engaged in activity at his place of work. The court’s analysis
disregarded and misapplied precedent to achieve a just outcome for Tibbs’s
bias-motivated assault, pushing the Commerce Clause beyond its constitutional
bearings in the process.
This Recent Development explores the flawed analysis of the Fourth
Circuit with a specific critique of its reliance on Taylor v. United States 12 and its
focus on the presence of (yet lack of analysis of) a jurisdictional hook provision.
Part I provides an overview of Hill’s prosecution and the related provisions of
the HCPA. Part II provides relevant background on the modern, foundational
Commerce Clause cases. Part III analyzes the Fourth Circuit opinion in Hill.
Finally, Part IV recommends an alternative constitutional approach for
regulating hate crimes and questions whether increased penalties for hate crimes
achieves the goal of future prevention.
I. THE HCPA AND THE CHARGE AGAINST HILL
By most accounts, Hill’s assault of Tibbs would be considered a hate crime,
which the Justice Department defines in simple terms as “a crime + motivation
for committing the crime based on bias.” 13 Accordingly, the analysis is
straightforward. Hill committed assault—a crime. When asked why he
committed assault, he told investigators he did not like gay people,

9. Id.
10. 927 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2019).
11. Pub. L. No. 111-84, div. E, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (2018)).
12. 136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016).
13. Learn About Hate Crimes, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/learn-abouthate-crimes [https://perma.cc/N3SL-R6VV]. More specifically, hate crimes require that the
motivating bias be unlawful under relevant statutory law. Harbani Ahuja, Note, The Vicious Cycle of
Hate: Systemic Flaws in Hate Crime Documentation in the United States and the Impact on Minority
Communities, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 37, 1867, 1870–71 (2016) (“Every hate crime consists of two
elements: first, the perpetrator must commit a crime; and second, the perpetrator must have been
motivated by an unlawful bias that is protected by hate crimes laws. The bias motive is what makes
hate crimes distinct: the victims of hate crimes are selected as targets due to some actual or perceived
protected characteristic such as race, gender, disability, religion, or sexual orientation.”).
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demonstrating bias. 14 Hill did not even attempt to provide another justification
for the assault. 15 Therefore, Hill committed a hate crime.
While the superficial analysis is simple, the prosecution was not. That is
because Virginia’s hate crime provision for assault and battery does not include
sexual orientation 16 as one of the classes protected by the statute. 17 Initially, Hill
was charged only with misdemeanor assault. 18 The state prosecutor, seeing an
opportunity for greater penalties, referred the case for federal prosecution under
the HCPA. 19 The Act, passed in 2009, was motivated in part by two notable
crimes. 20 Its namesakes, Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., were the victims
of brutal and highly publicized bias-motivated tortures and murders—
Shephard’s based on his sexual orientation and Byrd’s based on his race. 21
The specific provision of the HCPA used against Hill imposes criminal
liability when an individual
willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a
firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device,
attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or
perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability of any person. 22
But this is only the first step of an HCPA charge. Since the HCPA was
passed under the auspices of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 23
conviction under the Act requires that the crime also involve at least one of the
Act’s “jurisdictional hooks” to support conviction. In Commerce Clause
legislation, a jurisdictional hook (sometimes referred to as a jurisdictional
14. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194.
15. See id.
16. The statute provides increased criminal penalties “if a person intentionally selects the person
against whom an assault and battery resulting in bodily injury is committed because of his race, religious
conviction, color or national origin.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57(B) (LexisNexis current through the
2020 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
17. Id.
18. United States v. Hill, 182 F. Supp. 3d 546, 548 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 700 F.
App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2017).
19. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194.
20. See Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, CNN POL. (Oct. 28, 2009, 7:39 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/10/28/hate.crimes/ [https://perma.cc/E6CC-B6AW] (discussing the
murders of Matthew Shepherd and James Byrd, Jr.).
21. See Audra Burch, In Texas, a Decades-Old Hate Crime, Forgiven but Never Forgotten, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/james-byrd-jasper-texas-killing.html
[https://perma.cc/59EP-J62V (dark archive)]; Jude Sheerin, Matthew Shephard: The Murder That
Changed America, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45968606
[https://perma.cc/CS97-M46V].
22. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2018).
23. Article I Section 8 of the Constitution provides one of Congress’s enumerated legislative
powers as the ability to regulate “Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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element) is the part of a statute included to tie the regulated behavior to the
enumerated power, therefore allowing Congress to regulate the behavior. 24
These provisions, in theory, allow for courts to evaluate the constitutionality of
the Act’s application on a case-by-case basis.
The HCPA contains four such jurisdictional hooks. 25 The hook used in
Hill’s conviction requires that, in addition to showing bodily injury and biased
motivation, the prosecution must also show: “the conduct . . . interferes with
commercial or other economic activity in which the victim is engaged at the
time of the conduct; or . . . otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 26
Note that the jurisdictional element contains two pathways for showing
connection to commerce: the bodily injury may either (1) interfere with
commercial or economic activity, or (2) “otherwise affect[]” interstate
commerce. The indictment and eventual conviction of Hill rested on 18 U.S.C.
§ 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I), 27 requiring that the assault and battery interfere with
commercial or economic activity in which Tibbs was engaged in at the time. 28
The district court dismissed the indictment as unconstitutional on
Commerce Clause grounds. 29 However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
dismissal and reinstated the indictment in an unpublished opinion. 30 The
reinstated indictment alleged that

24. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (“A jurisdictional element, as
the term has been used in and after Lopez, refers to a provision in a federal statute that requires the
government to establish specific facts justifying the exercise of federal jurisdiction in connection with
any individual application of the statute.”); Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional
Existence Conditions and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1153 (2003) (“Congress sometimes
chooses to include in its statutes a ‘jurisdictional nexus’—that is, a requirement that the government
prove that the acts to which a statute is applied in a given case themselves affect interstate commerce.”);
Tara M. Stuckey, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal Regulations of
Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2102 (2006) (“A jurisdictional hook is a statutory
clause requiring that the regulated activity have a connection with interstate commerce.”).
25. The HCPA’s four hooks allow for a prosecution when the bias-motivated bodily injury (1)
occurred as a result or during the victim or defendant’s travel across a state or national border or while
using a channel or facility of interstate commerce; (2) was caused by the defendant using an
instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with the conduct; (3) was caused with a weapon
that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; or (4) interfered with commercial or economic
activity that the victim was engaged in at the time or otherwise affected interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B).
26. Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)–(II).
27. Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(II) (requiring that the crime “otherwise affects interstate or foreign
commerce”). The original crime against Hill also included this § 249(2)(B)(iv)(II) charge. However,
the government dropped the charge on remand and solely relied on the language tying the crime to
interference with commercial conduct the victim was engaged in at the time of the crime. United States
v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
28. Hill, 927 F.3d at 195.
29. United States v. Hill, 182 F. Supp. 3d 546, 555–556 (E.D. Va. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 700
F. App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2017).
30. Hill, 700 F. App’x at 238.
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on or about May 22, 2015 . . . [Defendant] did willfully cause bodily
injury to [Tibbs] by assaulting [Tibbs], including by punching [Tibbs],
because of [Tibbs’s] actual and perceived sexual orientation, namely that
he is gay; and that, in connection with the offense, [Defendant] [1]
interfered with commercial and other economic activity in which [Tibbs] was
engaged at the time of the conduct. 31
After a two-day trial in district court following remand, the jury found
Hill guilty and determined that Hill caused bodily injury to Tibbs, that he did
so willfully, that he did so because of Hill’s perceived sexual orientation, and
that his action “interfered with the commercial or economic activity in which
Tibbs was engaged at the time of the conduct.” 32 Hill then moved for acquittal
on similar grounds to those of his original dismissal: namely, that the HCPA as
applied exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 33 The district court
agreed and acquitted Hill. 34 The government appealed and the Fourth Circuit
reversed the acquittal. 35
The Fourth Circuit, looking to the foundational cases of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence for guidance, found that Hill’s conviction was sufficiently
connected to commerce. 36 In doing so, the court improperly upheld the
provision of the HCPA that supported his conviction, holding that the
existence of the jurisdictional elements was sufficient for constitutionality. 37
As much of the court’s reasoning stems from the essential Commerce
Clause precedent, it is helpful in analyzing the Hill court’s holding to discuss
the broad holdings and implications of each relevant case. We begin, as the
Fourth Circuit did, with United States v. Lopez. 38

31. Hill, 927 F.3d at 194 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 195 (internal quotations omitted).
33. Id. at 194.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 195, 210.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 204 (“[W]hereas the Lopez and Morrison Courts found it significant that the statutes at
issue had no interstate-commerce jurisdictional element, the provision in the Hate Crimes Act under
which the jury convicted Defendant expressly includes such an element. That element requires that, to
convict a defendant under the Hate Crimes Act, both a court and a fact-finder must determine, in each
case, that the defendant’s conduct ‘interfere[d] with commercial or other economic activity in which
the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct.’ Notably, Defendant has not identified any case—nor
have we found any such case—in which a federal criminal statute including an interstate commerce
jurisdictional element has been held to exceed Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.”
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (2018)) (citing United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 620
(6th Cir. 2012))).
38. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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II. BACK TO BASICS: THE RELEVANT COMMERCE CLAUSE CASES
In Lopez, the Supreme Court sought to articulate the “few and defined”
powers delegated to Congress under the Commerce Clause. 39 There, when
evaluating the constitutionality of the Gun Free School Zones Act, 40 the Court
identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under
its commerce power.” 41 The first category allows regulation of “the use of the
channels of interstate commerce.”42 This category includes regulation of roads
and other infrastructure used in interstate commerce. 43 The second category
outlined in Lopez allows the regulation of “the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce.” 44 This category
includes vehicles as well as objects in commerce. 45 Finally, and most generally,
the third category allows Congressional regulation of “activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce.” 46 This third category includes
intrastate “activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 47
Importantly, the Lopez Court held that the Gun Free School Zones Act,
which criminalized possession of a firearm in a school zone, was an
unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause since the statute “by its terms has
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.” 48 Additionally, the Court determined
that “[the statutory provision] contains no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question
affects interstate commerce.” 49 In essence, the Court found that the lack of a
“jurisdictional hook” cut against the State’s case that possession of a firearm in
a school zone was sufficiently tied to commerce. Notably, however, the Court
did not indicate that the mere inclusion of a jurisdictional element would have
rendered the statutory provision constitutional. 50
39. Id. at 558.
40. Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1701, 104 Stat. 4944, invalidated by Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, and amended
by Treasury Department Appropriation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. A, tit. 6, § 657, 110 Stat.
3009-369, 3009-369 to 3009-371 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2018)).
41. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255–56 (1964) (holding
that the Commerce Clause could be used to regulate an intrastate motel because it qualified as a channel
of interstate commerce); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917) (holding that the
Commerce Clause could be used to regulate “immoral” criminal activity utilizing interstate roadways).
44. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
45. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 90–91 (1824) (holding that vehicles are
integral to and thus regulable as commerce).
46. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 561.
49. Id.
50. Id. This idea is confirmed in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See infra note 56
and accompanying text.
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The second major case relevant to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is United
States v. Morrison. 51 In Morrison, the Supreme Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a provision of the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”) 52 that provided a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence. 53
There, the Court reaffirmed the three Lopez categories of activity regulable by
the Commerce Clause while also addressing the question of bias-motivated
violent crimes by holding that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not,
in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”54 In finding the VAWA civil
remedy provision unconstitutional, the Court “reject[ed] the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on
that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 55 The Court also
confirmed that a jurisdictional hook is probative but not determinative, finding
that “a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in pursuance
of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce.” 56
The Fourth Circuit also turned to Gonzales v. Raich 57 to support its holding
in Hill. 58 In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief prohibiting the
enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act 59 as applied to their personal
growth and consumption of marijuana for medical use. 60 In evaluating
Congress’s power to regulate the marijuana market under the third Lopez
category, 61 the Court held that precedent “establishes Congress’s power to
regulate purely local activities that are a part of an economic ‘class of activities’
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 62 Though the growth of
marijuana for personal use was not economic per se, Congress is permitted to
regulate it as a class of activity that “would undercut the regulation of the
interstate market in that commodity.” 63
With the constitutional table set, we now turn to Hill.

51. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
52. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941–42 (1994) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000)), invalidated by Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
53. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02.
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id. at 617.
56. Id. at 612 (emphasis added).
57. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
58. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 198 (4th Cir. 2019).
59. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
844(a) (2018)).
60. Raich, 545 U.S. at 8.
61. This third category is the power to regulate activities that “substantially affect interstate
commerce.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
62. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (first quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); and then
quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942)).
63. Id. at 18.
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III. WHAT THE HILL?
The Fourth Circuit assures us that Congress paid close attention to the
scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause when adopting the HCPA. 64
Unfortunately, the same close attention does not appear in the Fourth Circuit’s
Hill decision. As the court correctly notes, “[w]hether the Hate Crimes Act may
be constitutionally applied to an unarmed assault of a victim engaged in
commercial activity at his place of work appears to be an issue of first impression
in this Circuit or any other.” 65 As such, the court was left only with the
foundational Commerce Clause cases as well as disparate analogous case law to
decide the question. However, given the court’s reasoning, a reader would be
forgiven for believing that one such analogous case, Taylor v. United States,66
was directly on point. That treatment proves problematic.
A.

The Hill Majority’s Interpretation and Application of Taylor Is Misguided

In Taylor, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a
prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 67 which “ma[de] it a crime for a person to
affect commerce, or attempt to do so by robbery or extortion.” 68 There, the
defendant and other gang members broke into the homes of marijuana dealers
and demanded the location of drugs and money. 69 In their analysis, the
Supreme Court found that since the Raich decision upheld congressional
authority to regulate marijuana, and since the Hobbs Act criminalized robbery
interfering with commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction, the
prosecution was within the bounds of the Commerce Clause. 70 In the Fourth
Circuit’s interpretation, “Taylor, therefore, establishes that, pursuant to its
power under the Commerce Clause, Congress may proscribe violent conduct
when such conduct interferes with or otherwise affects commerce over which
Congress has jurisdiction.”71
The Fourth Circuit’s reading of Taylor in Hill is exceedingly and
conveniently broad. Close reading of the Taylor opinion leaves one struggling
to determine where, if at all, the Supreme Court “establishes” this Commerce
Clause power as the Fourth Circuit claims. In fact, what is notable about the
Fourth Circuit’s analysis is not what it says about Taylor but what it does not.
The Fourth Circuit disregards crucial pieces of Taylor in its analysis: the most
egregious exclusion being the Supreme Court’s insistence that “[their] holding
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 196–97 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 198.
136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016).
Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 793 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018)).
Id. at 2084 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018)).
Id. at 2078.
Id. at 2080.
Hill, 927 F.3d at 199.
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today is limited to cases in which the defendant targets drug dealers for the
purpose of stealing drugs or drug proceeds.” 72 It would appear that the Supreme
Court, careful so as not to disturb established Commerce Clause precedent,
expressly sought to withhold the very grant of authority on which the Fourth
Circuit relies.
Moreover, the Taylor Court concluded that “[b]ecause Congress may
regulate these intrastate [drug] activities based on their aggregate effect on
interstate commerce, it follows that Congress may also regulate intrastate drug
theft.” 73 Note the emphasis contained in the opinion on the specific crime
targeted by the Hobbs Act rather than extrapolation to “violent conduct”
generally. This distinction between specific and general crime was emphasized
by the Taylor Court when it focused on the profit-motivated language used by
the defendant who asked the victim “where the money was at, where the weed
was at.” 74 The Supreme Court’s focus on the economic nature of the crime at
issue in Taylor does not appear to support the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that
the Commerce Clause applies to “violent conduct” in general. This derails the
Fourth Circuit’s attempt to use Taylor as controlling precedent in Hill given the
fundamentally different nature of the crimes at issue.
The Fourth Circuit attempts to reconcile this economic versus violent
crime distinction, yet its analysis falls short. In justifying its use of Taylor
despite the obvious difference in the nature of the respective crime (robbery in
the case of Taylor and assault in Hill), the Fourth Circuit claims that the
“economic nature” argument in Taylor “rests on the incorrect premise that the
actus reus proscribed by a federal criminal statute must be ‘inherently economic’
in order for the statute to comply with the Commerce Clause.” 75 In other words,
the Fourth Circuit strains to use Taylor while rejecting its central holding—that
“[a]s long as Congress may regulate the purely intrastate possession and sale of
illegal drugs, Congress may criminalize the theft or attempted theft of those same
drugs.” 76
This dissonance is especially confusing given that the Fourth Circuit itself
recognizes that precedent weighs in favor of regulating crimes with an economic
actus reus. In fact, the Fourth Circuit argues that “the Hate Crimes Act’s
interstate commerce element ensures that the statute regulates only economic,
violent criminal conduct, not the type of ‘noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct’ at issue in Morrison.” 77 In sum, the Fourth Circuit states that an

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2082 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2076.
Id. at 2080.
Hill, 927 F.3d at 205, 207.
Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081 (emphasis added).
Hill, 927 F.3d at 204 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000)).
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economic actus reus is irrelevant 78 while simultaneously relying on cases that
make a clear distinction between economic and non-economic criminal
conduct. 79
To accomplish this, the Fourth Circuit analogizes the HCPA to the Hobbs
Act at issue in Taylor, telling us that “[t]he Hobbs Act . . . compl[ies] with the
Commerce Clause . . . not because robbery . . . [is] ‘inherently economic,’ but
rather because [it] contain[s] [a] jurisdictional element[] that limit[s] the
statute[’s] reach to those robberies . . . that interfere with or affect interstate
commerce.” 80 The Fourth Circuit treats the specific crimes the Hobbs Act
addresses as if they are somehow ancillary and not the target of a legislature
that likely considered its power under the Commerce Clause and made
decisions not only about the jurisdictional element but also the regulated crimes
themselves. In fact, the history of the Hobbs Act reveals that it originated as an
amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act 81 to weaken exceptions that
the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act provided to labor union activity. 82 Therefore,
even assuming that robbery is not inherently economic (as unintuitive an
assumption as it seems), the robbery initially contemplated and targeted by the
Hobbs Act dealt with labor unions resorting to violence in order to exact wages. 83
This stands in stark contrast to the violent conduct implicated by the HCPA—
bias-motivated assault.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit’s discussion ignores the Hobbs Act’s
statutory requirement that any violence that was not “robbery or extortion” be
“in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section.”84 The statutory language in the Hobbs Act makes clear that Congress
knew of and made a distinction between economic and noneconomic crimes.
Independent of any jurisdictional hook, the Hobbs Act required that these
noneconomic crimes be in furtherance of the economic crimes 85 for liability to
attach. 86 Similar language is plainly absent from the HCPA. This cuts strongly
78. Id. at 205 (“[W]hether the application of a federal statute proscribing violent crime complies
with the Commerce Clause does not turn on whether the act proscribed by the statute is ‘economic’ or
‘non-economic.’’’).
79. See discussion infra pp. 111–12.
80. Hill, 927 F.3d at 205–06. The court also discusses a federal arson statute upheld on similar
grounds. Arson, of course, is a crime against property, rendering it “economic” not only in its nature but
by its nature. As the Hobbs Act more specifically addresses crimes against persons, this Recent
Development will not address the simpler arson example.
81. Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018)).
82. In fact, the language in the Act would punish members of a labor union attempting to exact
wages through force and violence or threats thereof, which the Teamsters’ Union did in New York.
William B. Aycock, The Hobbs Act–An Amendment to the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, 25 N.C. L. REV.
58, 58–60 (1946).
83. Id. at 58.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018).
85. Recall that the Hobbs Act targets “robbery or extortion” explicitly. Id.
86. Id.
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against the Fourth Circuit’s claim that Taylor applies and that the
constitutionality of the Hobbs Act has any bearing on the HCPA.
There is reason to believe that the Fourth Circuit rushed to justify its
reliance on Taylor to avoid issues raised by Morrison. As previously discussed,
Morrison—one of the Supreme Court’s essential Commerce Clause cases—
definitively determined that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity” and were thus beyond the reach of
the Commerce Clause. 87 Compare this to the Taylor Court’s ruling, which was
supported “[b]ecause Congress may regulate these intrastate [drug] activities
based on their aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” 88 The natural
conclusion under Morrison would be to simply determine that orientationmotivated crimes of violence are also “not in any sense of the phrase” economic
activity. Had the Fourth Circuit not relied on Taylor, the prosecution likely
would have failed under the standard articulated in Morrison.
B.

The Jurisdictional Hook Is Insufficient To Subject Hill to Criminal Liability
Under the Commerce Clause

Fear not, says the Fourth Circuit, “for several reasons, Lopez and Morrison
are readily distinguishable from Defendant’s prosecution under the Hate
Crimes Act.” 89 The “several reasons” are, for all intents and purposes, one
reason: the HCPA features a jurisdictional hook provision that requires an
additional showing of relation to commerce. 90 To be fair, the Fourth Circuit is
correct in its statement that the precedential cases “found it significant that the
statutes at issue [in Lopez and Morrison] had no interstate-commerce
jurisdictional element.” 91
The court is incorrect, however, in abandoning any evaluation under Lopez
and Morrison at the mere presence of a jurisdictional element. While the court
noted that the defendant “has not identified any case—nor ha[s] [the Fourth
Circuit] found any such case—in which a federal criminal statute including an
interstate commerce jurisdictional element has been held to exceed Congress’s
authority under the Commerce Clause,” the court itself failed to identify any
binding precedent to conclude that the existence of a jurisdictional hook alone
is sufficient for constitutionality. 92 In fact, the court appears to have carefully
selected its persuasive authority to avoid confronting that very question,
referring to a Sixth Circuit decision that “regard[ed] the presence of such a
jurisdictional element [that ensures case-by-case analysis that the violation in
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (2016).
United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 204 (4th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 204–05.
Id. at 204.
Id.
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question affects interstate commerce] as the touchstone of valid congressional
use of its Commerce Clause powers to regulate non-commercial activity.” 93
Instead, the Fourth Circuit could have also considered the Third Circuit’s
opinion in United States v. Rodia, 94 which accurately noted that “[holding] that
the presence of a jurisdictional element automatically ensures the
constitutionality of a statute ignores the fact that the connection between the
activity regulated and the jurisdictional hook may be so attenuated as to fail to
guarantee that the activity regulated has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” 95 Other jurisdictions have similarly reacted skeptically to the
argument that inclusion is synonymous with constitutionality. 96
The Fourth Circuit’s lack of analysis beyond recognizing that the HCPA
contains a jurisdictional element represents the precise situation the Third
Circuit feared. 97 Any analysis of the jurisdictional element at play in Hill’s
prosecution would reveal at best an attenuated connection to the factors
articulated in Lopez.
The full jurisdictional element used to charge Hill for Tibbs’s assault
provided that the assault must “interfere[] with commercial or other economic
activity in which the victim is engaged at the time of the conduct.” 98 This
jurisdictional element is notable when compared to the language of the others.
Of the jurisdictional hooks, the first three, as well as subsection II of the fourth,
explicitly reflect the categories that the Lopez Court held to be within the ambit
of the Commerce Clause. 99 The language of these jurisdictional hooks includes
“channel, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce,” “travel

93. Id. (quoting United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2012)). The Sixth Circuit,
however, goes on to provide substantive analysis of those jurisdictional elements rather than holding
that their presence alone is sufficient. Coleman, 675 F.3d at 620–21 (concluding under Lopez that
“SORNA bears a rational relationship to Congress’s power to regulate the channels of interstate
commerce”).
94. 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 472.
96. See e.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 600 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We therefore have held that
a ‘jurisdictional element is not alone sufficient to render [a challenged statute] constitutional. That
argument . . . has no principled limit.’” (quoting United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th
Cir. 2000))); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 685 (7th Cir. 1995) (“In discussing the lack of a
jurisdictional element in Lopez, the Court simply did not state or imply that all criminal statutes must
have such an element, or that all statutes with such an element would be constitutional, or that any
statute without such an element is per se unconstitutional.”); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,
585 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The mere presence of a jurisdictional element, however, does not in and of itself
insulate a statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, or render it per se constitutional.”).
97. Rodia, 194 F.3d at 472.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) (2018).
99. The Commerce Clause permits regulation of “the use of the channels of interstate commerce”;
regulation of “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce”; and regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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. . . across a State line,” and affecting “interstate or foreign commerce.” 100 The
language of subsection I of the HCPA’s fourth jurisdictional element, by
contrast, does not make reference to any of the categories in Lopez.
Initially, the charge against Hill contained both subsections of element
four, which would have included a requirement that the prosecution show that
the assault “otherwise affected” interstate commerce. 101 The prosecutor
eventually dropped this element and solely relied on § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I),
requiring only that Hill’s conduct “interfere[d] with commercial or other
economic activity in which the victim [was] engaged at the time of the
conduct.” 102 On its face, this subsection is plainly not tied to any of the
established categories of Commerce Clause regulation the Supreme Court has
recognized. The section does not even mention a connection to interstate or
foreign commerce. One could even assume that the prosecutor identified
weaknesses in showing that Hill’s actions “otherwise affect[ed] interstate or
foreign commerce,” leading them to drop the charge altogether. 103 This
weakness seems especially relevant given the court’s recognition that Amazon
“did not miss any ‘critical pull times,’ or packaging deadlines, as a result of the
incident because other areas of the facility absorbed the work.” 104
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit tells us that “the Hate Crimes Act’s
interstate commerce element 105 ensures that each prosecution under the Hate
Crimes Act will bear the necessary relationship to commerce that renders the
crime within Congress’s purview.” 106 And yet the Fourth Circuit never
addresses which of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers expands that purview
to include § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). As Judge Agee notes in his dissent in Hill, “this
Circuit’s cases examining whether a jurisdictional element has ensured that
individual prosecutions fall within Congress’s Commerce Clause power—
regardless of any other factors that also did so—have all addressed statutory
language directly connecting the element to Congress’s constitutional

100. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B).
101. United States v. Hill, 927 F.3d 188, 195 (4th Cir. 2019).
102. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)).
103. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)).
104. Id. at 194. The majority argues that Amazon’s ability to absorb the interruption is irrelevant
since Congress may have determined that “the aggregate effect of assaults on individuals engaged in
ongoing economic or commercial activity . . . amounts to a ‘substantial effect’ on interstate commerce.”
Id. at 202–03. The court fails to reconcile why this aggregation is permissible considering the
unambiguous language of Morrison where the Supreme Court “reject[ed] the argument that Congress
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.” United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). The “effect on individuals
engaged in commerce” language is insufficient to render the assault aggregable economic activity. See
supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text.
105. This language is especially interesting considering that the phrase “interstate commerce” does
not even appear in the statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I).
106. Hill, 927 F.3d at 208–09.
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authority.” 107 For the Fourth Circuit majority, § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) is
constitutional merely because it exists.
Compare the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Hill to the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Taylor. In Taylor, the statutory language of the Hobbs Act used
against the defendant was tied specifically to a realm of activity the Court has
found regulable under the Commerce Clause. First, the relevant statutory
section specified that a defendant’s “robbery or extortion” must “obstruct[],
delay[], or affect[] commerce or the movement of an article or commodity in
commerce.” 108 On its face, this language is not wholly dissimilar to the HCPA’s
mention of “commercial” activity in the jurisdictional element used to charge
Hill. 109 Neither section makes explicit reference to interstate commerce,
channels, instrumentalities, or to interstate travel. And yet, the Hobbs Act is
further limited by its definition of the word commerce. In the statute’s
definition section, commerce is defined as
commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or
Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a
State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which
the United States has jurisdiction. 110
This inclusion, specifically the “commerce over which the United States has
jurisdiction” language, essentially incorporates the categories of commerce that
the Court has upheld. Since the Commerce Clause effectively determines what
constitutes “commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction,” this
definition of commerce prevents the Hobbs Act from regulating commerce
beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause.
This is markedly different from the language of the jurisdictional hook at
issue in Hill. The HCPA does not define or limit the phrase “commercial or
economic activity” for the purposes of § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I). There is no
indication that the provision is meant to target only commercial activity with
“interstate” effect or activity “over which the United States has jurisdiction.”
In fact, given the HCPA’s broad language, it is hard to imagine what “economic
activity” would not fall under the provision. Given that little human activity is
exempt from ties to commerce, the HCPA’s wide net could encapsulate a broad
range of tenuous “economic” activity. What if Tibbs was assaulted while
walking to the grocery store? Surely human motion with the intent to engage
in commerce is “commercial or . . . economic activity.” What if Tibbs was on
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 214 (Agee, J., dissenting).
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018).
Id. § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I).
Id. § 1951(b)(3).
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his way to work or was on his way home from work? What if Tibbs was simply
standing in an open field using his cell phone—a cell phone he paid for, with a
data plan he paid for, using apps he paid for—all generating commoditized data,
pinging off of towers owned by massive telecommunications companies who in
turn sell that data for marketing purposes? To a surprising (and disturbing)
extent, nearly any and all action is in some way commercial or economic. 111
The Fourth Circuit tosses such worries to the side, writing that the
“slippery-slope concern” that would turn the Commerce Clause into
“unfettered authority to regulate wholly intrastate conduct traditionally subject
to regulation by the States . . . is not present here.” 112 Not only is the concern
present, it is looming. 113 As Justice Thomas writes in his dissent in Taylor, “if
these limitations are not respected, Congress will accumulate the general police
power that the Constitution withholds.” 114
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Aside from the constitutional failings, a bevy of policy considerations
weigh against the Fourth Circuit’s use of the Commerce Clause in Hill. First,
in allowing expansive prosecutions under the HCPA, states are relieved of any
pressure to expand their protected classes for hate crimes. Why would Virginia
feel the need to add sexual orientation protections to any of its statutes when
the HCPA does the work for them? Hill teaches us that reliance on a federal
criminal statute is misplaced. For one, hate crime prosecutions, at least those
using § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I), will have to rely on flimsy constitutionality that
111. See, e.g., David Nield, How Location Tracking Actually Works on Your Smartphone, GIZMODO
(Sept. 3, 2018, 10:30 AM), https://gizmodo.com/how-location-tracking-actually-works-on-yoursmartphone-1828356441 [https://perma.cc/WB95-3X3R]; Louise Story, Anywhere the Eye Can See, It’s
Likely To See an Ad, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007
/01/15/business/media/15everywhere.html [https://perma.cc/TZV3-DZ78 (dark archive)]; Zack
Whittaker, US Cell Carriers Are Selling Access to Your Real-Time Phone Location Data, ZDNET (May 14,
2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/us-cell-carriers-selling-access-to-real-time-locationdata/ [https://perma.cc/3Q45-ZBCE].
112. Hill, 927 F.3d at 205.
113. For example, federal prosecutors may (as they sometimes do) exercise authority under such
federal criminal statutes to second guess local law enforcement decisions since “the [Justice]
Department’s own express policies reflect that increased federal involvement in local matters is often
based on the fact that federal prosecutors disagree with state judgments about the appropriate sentence
for criminal conduct and what makes an ‘effective’ prosecution.” Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and
Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 576 (2011). At the same
time, state and local officials may abuse such federal laws to circumvent the political will of their local
communities. Id. at 577–78. (“[I]t is not necessarily the case that local officials making [the decision to
have federal prosecutors intervene in local prosecutions] reflect the views of the larger electorate in a
community. Nor is there any assurance that they are selecting the right cases for this differential
sentencing treatment or that allowing cases to be handpicked for harsher treatment comports with
notions of due process or federalism. And of course, there remains the substantive issue of whether
federal involvement and the higher sentences it brings, on balance, produce better policy.”).
114. Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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leaves opportunities for appeal and reversal wide open. 115 This concern—the
constant threat of defendants challenging the constitutionality of their
convictions—was theorized from the very outset of federal hate crime
regulation. 116 Hate crime victims deserve more consistent and more stable
prosecutions of their offenders.
Prosecutions such as Hill’s also invite circuit splits. Should the victims of
hate crimes hope the crime against them occurs in a circuit with an expansive
view of § 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I)? To borrow language from due process
scholarship, the provision at issue in Hill is both overinclusive and
underinclusive. First, it is underinclusive in that there will be an eventual hate
crime that the Act does not reach—a case so “un-economic” that no reasonable
court would find it has come under the Commerce Clause’s power. Second, the
provision is overinclusive because it will open the door for an unconstitutional
extension of Congressional police power. If a punch is regulable as commerce,
what is not? Victims of hate crimes will find themselves trapped between federal
law that cannot constitutionally reach their attacker and state law that refuses
to do so. That is not to mention the Fourth Circuit’s contribution to the
growing split between circuits struggling to determine what role the presence
of a jurisdictional hook plays in evaluating the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.
A.

Structural Solution: Constitutionally Influencing State-Level Criminal Justice
Reforms

The simplest solution, at least immediately, would be to strike
§ 249(a)(2)(B)(iv)(I) from the HCPA. However, there is still the concern that
the Act unconstitutionally infringes on state police power generally and violates
principles of federalism. 117 Even ruling the Act unconstitutional as a whole and
striking it down would not be the end of the matter. Although the Commerce
Clause may be unable to reach hate crimes, that does not mean Congress as a
body is powerless. If Congress wants to flex its constitutional muscle, it could,
for instance, do so under the Spending Clause. 118

115. Justifiably so.
116. Christopher Chorba, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 355–66 (2001).
117. See, e.g., Steven R. Eatherly, The “Bergholz Barbers”: The Hate Crimes Prevention Act Is
Unconstitutional as Exceeding Congress’s Power Under the Commerce Clause, 93 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
453, 484–85 (2016) (arguing that the HCPA is unconstitutional as it erodes the ability of state and
local law enforcement to shape their localities).
118. The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides Congress the enumerated power to “lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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In fact, Congress has used the Spending Clause to exert power over the
states that it could not otherwise wield. 119 As Justice Rehnquist explained in
South Dakota v. Dole, 120 “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s
‘enumerated legislative fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.” 121 In the
legislation challenged in Dole, Congress, believing itself to be unable to raise
the national drinking age to twenty-one, conditioned the receipt of federal
highway funding on individual states doing so. 122 Congress could, in theory,
condition federal funding for state and local law enforcement on the broadening
of state-level hate crime protections. 123
There are several benefits to exerting Spending Clause power to address
hate crimes. First, prosecution of hate crimes is firmly within state police
power. 124 Prosecutors and victims need not worry about inevitable appeals
hampering their pursuit of justice. Second, this change has, at least in theory,
broad appeal across the political spectrum. For one, it expands the power of
local law enforcement and prosecutors, appeasing those with high trust in police
(a trust increasingly split along partisan lines). 125 At the same time, it expands
upon our growing appreciation of bias, especially against marginalized

119. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that Congress conditioning
receipt of federal highway funds on raising minimum drinking age was within the authority of the
Constitution’s Spending Clause).
120. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
121. Id. at 207 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
122. Id. at 205.
123. A similar approach was employed in the Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013 which
reduced federal funding for states that did not provide the DOJ with data concerning deaths of those
in state custody. Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 60105
(2018)). The Center for American Progress has similarly outlined several areas in which Congressional
appropriations to the DOJ can impact state-level criminal justice reforms. MIKE CROWLEY & ED
CHUNG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, CONGRESS CAN LEAD ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
THROUGH FUNDING CHOICES 1 (2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2017/09
/07054711/DOJGrant-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CBB-P8GN]. Similar approaches are also proposed
as a part of current police reform bills in the wake of the high-profile police killing of George Floyd.
Catie Edmonson, Democrats Unveil Sweeping Bill Targeting Police Misconduct and Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES
(June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/us/politics/democrats-police-misconduct-billprotests.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/WZX4-7GUR (dark archive)]
(“[Legislation] would also condition some federal grants on the adoption of anti-discrimination training
and practices.”).
124. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) (holding that the
state’s police power embraces regulations that, among other things, promote the public health, morals,
or safety).
125. See generally, Anna Brown, Republicans More Likely than Democrats To Have Confidence in Police,
PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/13/republicans-morelikely-than-democrats-to-have-confidence-in-police/ [https://perma.cc/WQ6X-9F3L] (discussing
differences in how Republicans and Democrats view the role and performance of police).
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communities—including those with disabilities 126 and members of the
LGBTQ+ community 127—not traditionally protected by this type of legislation.
B.

Policy Considerations: Is Hate Crime Legislation Worth Saving?

Any progress toward saving the HCPA also depends more fundamentally
on whether hate crime legislation is effective in reaching its perceived goals. 128
Growing reevaluation of hate crime legislation has brought its effectiveness and
motivation into question. Hate crime legislation may fall into the category of
“symbolic politics” as a largely symbolic reassurance to the public, rather than a
substantive effort to combat bias. 129 Under the theory of symbolic politics, the
true beneficiaries of hate crime legislation are politicians seeking to “obtain the
political support of those interested” by providing a mere “pat on the back.” 130
At the same time, criticisms abound regarding public misunderstanding of the
“typical” hate crime defendant, commonly believed to be a violent hate group
member. In reality, “[t]he misconception that hate groups, which include
skinheads, neo-Nazis, white nationalists and black separatists groups, cause hate
crimes is unfounded.” 131 Rather, most charged under hate crime laws are
younger males in their teens to early twenties acting together. 132 Less than five
percent are members of hate groups. 133 Further, many offenders may not be
biased themselves but were “following the lead of a more biased peer.” 134
Research also suggests that “hate” may not even be the driving force
behind what most consider hate crimes. A 2011 study found that hate groups
126. See, e.g., Debra McKinney, The Invisible Hate Crime, INTELLIGENCE REP. (2018),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/invisible-hate-crime#ongoing-fight
[https://perma.cc/5S4M-QRYL].
127. The Human Rights Campaign reports that only twenty states address hate or bias crimes
based on sexual orientation and gender identity while eleven address crimes based only on sexual
orientation. State Maps of Law & Policies, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/statemaps/hate-crimes [https://perma.cc/A4EV-L7GM] (last updated Jan. 2, 2020). A 2019 FBI report of
hate crimes occurring in 2018 found that one in five were motivated by anti-LGBTQ bias. FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2018 HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2019),
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018 [https://perma.cc/C992-4VGZ].
128. See, e.g., James Doubeck, How Well Do Hate Crime Laws Really Work?, NPR (June 28, 2015),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/28/417231920/how-well-do-hate-crime-lawsreally-work [https://perma.cc/L9PJ-PB8D]; Dashka Slater, The Fire on the 57 Bus in Oakland, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/01/magazine/the-fire-on-the-57-busin-oakland.html [https://perma.cc/5DLR-HR7A (dark archive)]. For a broad criticism of hate crime
legislation, see generally Briana Alongi, Note, The Negative Ramifications of Hate Crime Legislation: It’s
Time To Reevaluate Whether Hate Crime Laws Are Beneficial to Society, 37 PACE L. REV. 326 (2017).
129. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal
Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1248 (2000).
130. Id. at 1250–51.
131. Alongi, supra note 128, at 332.
132. Slater, supra note 128.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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had no influence on hate crime levels in the United States between 2002 and
2008. 135 That same study found that economic factors like poverty and
unemployment are strongly connected to hate crimes. 136 This suggests that hate
crime victims are targeted not for specific protected characteristics but because
they generally belong to a social group considered more “vulnerable” than that
of the defendant. 137 In this way, “symbolic” hate crime legislation could be
viewed as a placation of sorts to avoid the more arduous policy efforts required
to address underlying poverty and unemployment inequalities.
Still, there remains the retributive argument that harsher punishment for
hate crimes reflects a moral stand in favor of protecting and promoting tolerance
for oppressed minorities. Yet, some have criticized increased penalties as
depriving hate crime perpetrators of any meaningful way to come to terms with
the “bias” that motivated their crime. 138 In some instances, increased penalties
may even solidify the offender’s bias by contributing to a worldview in which
relations between “competing groups” are based upon characteristics like race,
gender, religion, or sexual orientation. 139 There are similar doubts about
increased penalization and its effect on victims. 140
CONCLUSION
Hill’s conviction under the HCPA is unconstitutional. The Fourth
Circuit’s reliance on Taylor to circumvent the reality that the foundational
Commerce Clause cases weigh against its holding is unpersuasive and
misleading. In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit demonstrates the sort of judicial
gymnastics required when Congress pushes its power under the Commerce
Clause beyond the pale of constitutionality. Further, even if we assume, as the
court does, that the inclusion of a jurisdictional hook is sufficient for ensuring
constitutional compliance, true analysis of the jurisdictional element used to

135. Matt E. Ryan & Peter T. Leeson, Hate Groups and Hate Crime, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
256, 257–58 (2011) (“There’s little evidence that hate groups have an important relationship to hate
crime in America.”).
136. Id. at 260.
137. Id. at 256 (“[W]hen people endure economic hardship they get frustrated. They take their
frustration out on vulnerable social groups, such as ethnic, sexual and religious minorities.”).
138. Scholarship has indicated that a restorative justice approach better emphasizes the
perpetrators’ need to heal their damaged relationships with the victims, other community members,
and themselves by focusing on reparation rather than stigmatization. Mark Walters & Carolyn Hoyle,
Healing Harms and Engendering Tolerance: The Promise of Restorative Justice for Hate Crime, in HATE
CRIME: CONCEPTS, POLICY, FUTURE DIRECTIONS 228, 230–31 (Neil Chakraborti ed., 2010).
139. Beverley A. McPhail, Hating Hate: Policy Implications of Hate Crime Legislation, 74 SOC. SERV.
REV. 635, 646 (2000).
140. See, e.g., Walters & Hoyle, supra note 138, at 229 (“[P]unishment enhancements might serve
to uphold victims’ emotional attachments to ‘hate, anger, malice and revenge’, [sic] rather than diminish
them.” (quoting LES MORAN & BEVERLY SKEGGS, SEXUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE
42 (2004))).
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convict Hill demonstrates that it is plainly beyond the established bounds of
the Commerce Clause.
No sane individual would condone Hill’s actions. And yet in the effort to
justify his conviction, the Fourth Circuit has both extended the Commerce
Clause and given it new meaning. This raises questions that date back to the
very founding of our democracy when James Madison wrote his now ubiquitous
maxim that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.” 141 We would do well to remember
it.
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